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Abstract
Each eye movement we make brings new information into our visual system.
The selection of each fixation is the result of a complex interplay of image
features, current task goals, and biases in motor control and perception.
To what extent are we aware of the selection of eye movements and their
visual consequences? Here we use a converging methods approach to answer
this question in three diverse experiments. In Experiment 1, participants
were directed to find a target in a complex scene by a verbal description of
it. We then presented the path the eyes took to find the target together
with those of another participant. Participants could only identify their own
path when the comparison scanpath was searching for a different target.
In Experiment 2, participants viewed a scene for three seconds and then
named some objects from the scene. When asked whether they had looked
directly at a given object, participants’ responses were primarily determined
by whether or not the object had been named, and not by whether it had
been fixated. In Experiment 3, participants executed eye movements towards
single targets, and then viewed an animated replay of either the eye move-
ment they just executed, or that of someone else. Participants were at chance
to identify their own eye movement, even when it contained large under- and
overshoot corrections. The consistent inability to report on oneâĂŹs own
eye movements across experiments suggests awareness of eye movements is
extremely impoverished or altogether absent. This is surprising given that
information about prior eye movements is clearly used during visual search,
motor error correction, and learning.
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Although it has long been known that attention can be deployed to loca-1
tions in a scene in the absence of eye movements (known as “covert attention”,2
e.g. Posner (1980)), many experimenters have concluded that it is not possible3
to execute an eye movement to a location without also attending there (e.g.4
Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995; Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986). Indeed,5
the oculomotor readiness hypothesis (Klein, 1980), also known as the premo-6
tor theory of attention (Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umiltá, 1987) suggests7
that covert attention and eye movements are co-dependent; covert spatial at-8
tention is simply an eye movement that is prepared but not executed, making9
eye movements an “extreme” form of spatial attention. Under this idea, one10
might expect the process of attentional competition, selection, execution of the11
saccade, and accrual of new information arriving at the fovea to leave a lasting12
imprint on conscious experience. Eye movements also generate a massive signal13
in visual cortex. Visual areas are mapped retinotopically, such that every eye14
movement we make changes the contents of all the receptive fields of visual neu-15
rones from the retina all the way to higher-order visual areas (for a review, see16
Wurtz, 2008)). Given the enormous perceptual changes induced by eye move-17
ments, together with the fact that these changes are self-generated and have18
been suggested to necessarily involve attention, it seems reasonable to assume19
we should be able to report on these changes with some degree of accuracy.20
Two relatively recent studies have concluded that awareness of eye move-21
ments is present, but limited. Foulsham and Kingstone (2013) presented participants22
with a series of photographs of scenes to remember. After completing a memory task, two23
versions of each scene were presented simultaneously. Overlaid on one image was an array24
of dots depicting the locations the observer had fixated while viewing that image during25
the initial display phase, and on the other image were fixations from someone else viewing26
the same image. Despite the approximately ten minute delay between viewing and recog-27
nition, accuracy was above chance (but only slightly, at 55%). Marti, Bayet, and Dehaene28
(2015) examined whether individuals can successfully reproduce the sequences of saccades29
they just executed on single trials of a visual search task using a computer mouse to click30
on the spatial locations in the order in which they looked at them. The spatial similarity31
of the series of mouse-clicks to the immediately preceding sequence of saccades was higher32
than for a saccade sequence produced in response to the same search array presented ear-33
lier in the experiment, suggesting some memory for the fixations that were just generated.34
However, participants missed many fixations and also reported many fixations that did not35
occur. The authors concluded that participants’ ability to recreate their eye movements36
was limited, and may represent introspection of covert shifts of attention as opposed to eye37
movements per se.38
Conscious experience is a notoriously difficult subject of study. In the case of report-39
ing on one’s own eye movements, there are a number of challenges to overcome. One of these40
challenges is that, when asked to identify or reproduce one’s own fixation patterns, there are41
multiple ways to achieve above-chance performance. The Foulsham and Kingstone (2013)42
experiment used natural scenes, which participants were instructed to try and remember.43
Discrimination of one’s own fixations compared to someone else’s on the same scene could44
indeed be driven by a memory of the experience of looking at a particular object, as the45
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authors suggest. But accuracy could also be driven by a memory of a particular object46
simply having been in the scene, leading to the inference that if they remember it, they47
probably looked at it (which, as we will discuss later, is usually true). In other words,48
accuracy to identify one’s own fixations could be inflated by a memory of the existence49
of particular objects in a scene. On the other hand, fixations were presented to the par-50
ticipants with no timing or order information, and the presentation took place following51
a long delay relative to the initial viewing. The minimal information and delay may lead52
to an underestimation of how well people can recognize their own eye movements. The53
Marti et al. (2015) experiment overcame this latter limitation by requiring participants to54
report their fixations immediately following each search. While this removes the delay and55
may improve memory, it also introduces the potential for participants to adopt a strategy56
of generating more easily identifiable or reproducible fixation sequences during the initial57
search. Although the authors attempted to rule this out by comparing search during the58
introspection phase to an initial block of search only (with no introspection), small changes59
in strategy would be very difficult to detect and could be sufficient to elevate accuracy above60
baseline. More generally, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that a strategy, intention,61
or task can be recognised from a given eye movement or scanpath (e.g. Borji & Itti, 2014).62
Participants may be able to infer mental state from some scanpaths and compare this to63
their own remembered mental state while they viewed the same scene. This is not the same64
as actually remembering where they looked.65
Although both of these studies suggest some ability to introspect and report on one’s66
own eye movement, earlier work indirectly suggested participants are not aware of the67
perceptual effect of their own eye movements. In the double-step saccade paradigm, partic-68
ipants move their eyes towards a peripheral target which can jump to a new location during69
the movement. Participants tend to make a corrective saccade to the new target position,70
even though they report little to no awareness of the target’s movement itself (Becker &71
Jürgens, 1979; Bridgeman, Hendry, & Stark, 1975). The focus in this area of research72
has been on awareness of information presented during saccades, rather than awareness of73
one’s own movements, however, so it is not known whether and to what extent partici-74
pants may be able to report on their corrective movements when explicitly asked about75
them. In other visually-guided actions such as reaching to a target, participants are able76
to immediately reproduce a reaching trajectory with an error induced by a target jumping77
to a new position, even when they are unaware of the jump itself (Johnson & Haggard,78
2005; Johnson, van Beers, & Haggard, 2002). This suggests there is a stored memory of the79
motor correction in the absence of awareness of the signal that elicited the correction in the80
first place. It makes sense for motor processes to store and use information about motor81
corrections in order for motor learning to take place; indeed, after repeated trials in which82
the motor target moves to the same new location, both eye (McLaughlin, 1967) and hand83
(de Graaf, Pélisson, Prablanc, & Goffart, 1995) movements will be directed towards the ex-84
pected final position of the target rather than its initial position, even though participants85
remain unaware of the target position shift. The motor system may be able to store and86
use information in the absence of explicit perceptual awareness of that information (e.g. as87
suggested by the dual-route model of visual perception, (Goodale & Milner, 1992)), so the88
existence of a correction does not necessarily mean participants will be able to report on it.89
Further results suggest saccade errors can go unnoticed even when they are quite90
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large. Mokler and Fischer (1999) found self-reporting of saccade errors to be relatively91
poor. In their experiment, a peripheral target would appear and the correct response was92
to generate an eye movement in the opposite direction (known as an antisaccade). They93
found an average error rate of nearly 20% with the majority of these errors consisting of an94
initial saccade towards the target followed by a corrective saccade. Participants failed to95
recognise around 50% of these errors (see also Robinson and Irwin (2016)). Similarly,96
in oculomotor capture (e.g. Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, & Irwin, 1998) the participants’ task97
is to move their eyes to a color singleton. On some trials a sudden onset is added to the98
display at the same time as the colour singleton is revealed. On a substantial proportion of99
trials (30-80%, depending on timing and distance conditions) the eyes are directed towards100
the sudden onset, even though it not relevant to the task. The authors “explicitly asked101
participants whether they were aware that the appearance of the new object affected their102
eye movements. Observers indicated that they were sure that their eye movements were103
not affected by the appearance of the new object.” This is consistent with the persistence104
of erroneous saccades towards the sudden onset in both of the above studies, given that105
participants would likely correct their error if they knew they were repeatedly making it.106
Inconsistent, however, are the results from Belopolsky, Kramer, and Theeuwes (2008), who107
conducted an ERP study directly investigating awareness of errors in an oculomotor capture108
experiment. After each trial participants were asked if they moved their eyes directly to the109
target or not. Participants accurately reported the error on nearly two thirds of error trials.110
However, the proportion of trials on which the eyes were directed to the sudden onset was111
comparatively low in this study (16%), likely because onsets were constrained to locations112
that were far from the target position. This likely made erroneous eye movements towards113
onsets less frequent, and more noticeable, than in the original study.114
The Theeuwes et al. (1998) and Mokler and Fischer (1999) experiments had the115
advantage of using very simple geometric stimuli and very constrained saccade task pa-116
rameters which limit the potential for alternative strategies for reporting on one’s own eye117
movements. However, they do rely on self-report on eye movement accuracy,118
explicitly reported after every trial. This leads to the concern noted previously119
that participants may deliberately alter the way they move their eyes to make120
it easier to report where they looked, suggesting these studies may be overesti-121
mating awareness. On the other hand, exposing participants to repeated trials122
in which single eye movements to simple stimuli are required could impede the123
ability to discriminate one eye movement from another. Under more natural124
circumstances, in which eye movements are employed in the service of gathering125
information in a more natural scene, we may find people are reasonably good at126
reporting on the consequence of the process of competition and selection that127
drives eye movements to particular objects or locations.128
It should be clear from the above discussion that the extent to which we129
are aware of our own eye movements is an important but difficult question to130
answer. No single approach can satisfactorily address all the challenges associated with131
probing self-awareness of eye movements. Our goal in this series of three experiments is132
therefore to use converging methods to understand whether, and to what extent, partic-133
ipants can recognize their own eye movements. In Experiments 1 and 2, we use natural134
and complex scenes and sequences of multiple fixations, and participants had to explicitly135
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recall their fixations, similar to the approach used by Foulsham and Kingstone (2013) and136
Marti et al. (2015). However, we also manipulate the availability of alternative strategies137
for elevating accuracy above chance, namely using inferences about task or search goal (Ex-138
periment 1) or memory for objects in a scene (Experiment 2). We find that in the absence139
of these strategies, accuracy to recognise or report on one’s own fixations is minimal and140
does not differ from chance. In Experiment 3, participants made simple saccades to single141
targets and had to state whether the animation of the eye movement following the trial was142
their own or someone else’s. We perturbed the target position on a proportion of trials to143
induce corrective saccades. This allowed us to determine whether or not participants were144
able to recognise their own saccades when they contained corrections, or to correctly reject145
saccades that contained corrections when their own saccades were accurate. Participants146
had a bias to think accurate saccades were their own, and were otherwise at chance at this147
task. The results from these three diverse experiments converge on the same conclusion:148
people are generally not directly aware of their own eye movements, but they have many149
strategies at their disposal that they can use to elevate their accuracy to report on their150
eye movements above chance.151
General Methods152
Set-up153
All experiments conducted within this study were undertaken in the Eye Movements154
and Attention laboratory at the University of Aberdeen. Equipment and methods that are155
common to all the experiments are described here. Additional materials are outlined under156
each experiment methods section. Experimental scripts were created and run using Mat-157
Lab with the PsychToolBox (Brainard, 1997) and Eyelink Toolbox (Cornelissen, Peters, &158
Palmer, 2002). A PowerMac running OSX 10.8.2 was used and stimuli were presented on a159
Sony Trimaster EL computer screen at a resolution of 1080 × 1920. Participant responses160
were recorded using an Apple keyboard with numeric keyboard, a mouse or voice record-161
ing applications, depending on the experimental design. An EyeLink 1000 (SR Research,162
Mississauga, Canada) was used to track eye movements. The protocol for each of the exper-163
iments was reviewed and approved by the Psychology Ethics Committee at the University164
of Aberdeen.165
Participants166
Participants were recruited from the population of students and other members of167
the academic community at the University of Aberdeen. All participants had normal or168
corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment was conducted with the full understanding169
and signed consent of each participant. Participants were remunerated £5-10 for their170
time, depending on the length of the experiment. Some participants took part in multiple171
experiments.172
Analysis173
We have chosen to follow recent advice from Cumming (2013) on the reporting of174
results in psychology research. Namely, we will avoid using p-values and null-hypothesis175
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significance testing wherever possible. We expect to find a range of abilities for different176
observers, and our aim is to measure, report, and interpret that range under different tasks177
and conditions. Where appropriate, we use general linear mixed-effect models (from the178
lme4 package for R) to estimate effect sizes and standard errors while factoring our random179
effects associated with differences between individual observers and images. 95% confidence180
intervals will be obtained by bootstrapping using the confint function. The data from these181
experiments has been made publicly available1.182
Experiment 1: Visual Search183
In our first experiment, we were interested in discovering whether participants are184
able to recognize their own scanpath relative to someone else’s viewing the same image.185
We followed the methods of Foulsham and Kingstone (2013), who observed186
accuracy at this task that was only just above chance (55%). This result suggests187
participants are able to do this successfully for a few images or scanpaths, but188
are at chance for the majority of trials. On the one hand, it is possible that participants189
are using a memory for which objects were fixated to do the fixation recognition task,190
as the authors suggest. However, an alternative route through which participants could191
achieve above-baseline accuracy in the scanpath recognition task is to infer a particular192
strategy or goal from the scanpaths they are shown and then match this to their own193
remembered goal or strategy. This strategy could also pose an alternative explanation for194
why Marti et al. (2015) found that participants could reproduce their own scanpaths with195
a mouse immediately following search: a search path could be reproduced by remembering196
and implementing a strategy or mental state evoked during the initial search, rather than197
remembering the eye movements per se. This experiment tests this alternative explanation198
by manipulating search instructions.199
We asked participants to search for a particular target in cartoon images taken from200
the Where’s Wally children books. Participants then had to discriminate their own scanpath201
from that of someone else. Following Foulsham and Kingstone (2013), participants did not202
carry out the scanpath discrimination task until after all images had been viewed, so they203
could not strategically change their search behaviour to make their own scanpaths more204
recognizable. A description of what the participant needed to find in each scene was provided205
verbally over headphones at the start of each trial. We manipulated the search instructions206
to control how the participant searched, and therefore how similar a given participant’s207
fixations were likely to be relative to those of other observers. Specifically, relative to the208
comparison scanpath, participants were given a) the same search target b) a different search209
target, c) a description of the search target that first provided a salient landmark and then210
the target (i.e., “near [the landmark] is [the target]”) and d) a description in the opposite211
order (i.e. “[the target] near [the landmark]”). We expected that scanpaths that came from212
searches prompted by the same target description should be more difficult to discriminate213
than those prompted by different descriptions of the same target, with search for a different214
target altogether providing the most easily discriminated scanpath.215
1insert URL here if paper is accepted
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Figure 1 . Example stimulus with scan-paths overlaid. The four referring expressions for
this trial were (A) “at the upper right, the sphinx”; (B) “at the upper right, the man holding
the red vase with a stripe”; (C) “at the upper right, the man holding the red vase with a
stripe to the left of the sphinx”; (D) “at the upper right, to the left of the sphinx, the man
holding the red vase with a stripe on it”.
Methods216
Participants. Thirty-two participants (median age 23, range = 19 - 42 years old,217
21 females) took part in the current study. One participant was dropped due to excessively218
long reaction times. Due to the design of our study (where each participant’s scanpath is219
compared to that from the previous participant), the participant that followed this rejected220
participant also had to be discarded from analysis as they would have been comparing their221
typical length scanpaths to excessively long scanpaths.222
Stimuli. Stimuli (images and search instructions) were taken from Clarke, Elsner,223
and Rohde (2013b), in which participants were given a target and asked to provide a224
description of how to find it (known in linguistics as a referring expression). We used as225
a target one of the sixteen targets per image used in this previous study, as well as one of226
the landmarks that had been spontaneously named by participants to help others to locate227
the target. The following variations were constructed to give us four search instruction228
conditions:229
(A) Find the landmark230
(B) Find the target231
(C) Find the target next to the landmark232
(D) Next to the landmark, you will find the target233
Search instructions for each image all began with the same regional descriptor (“in234
the upper left. . . ”), followed by the specified search target. Twenty-eight images were used235
in total. An example image with accompanying search instructions for the four conditions236
is shown in in Figure 1.237
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Procedure. Immediately following image onset, an audio recording of the search238
instruction was played to participants over headphones, giving them the necessary informa-239
tion required to find the target. Participants pressed the space bar on the keyboard when240
they had found the specified target. They were then required to use the mouse to click on241
the target. This was done so that we had a record of search accuracy and participants were242
not able to just press space without finding the target. Only eye movements from image243
onset to the space bar response were used.244
After completing all 28 visual search trials, participants then carried out the second245
section of the experiment. This consisted of viewing all 28 images again (in a new random246
order), with two scanpaths (in red and blue) drawn on top, as illustrated in Figure 1.247
Scanpaths were represented as a series of line segments connecting the gaze points recorded248
by the EyeLink. Gaze samples falling outside of the image were discarded. One scanpath249
illustrated the participant’s eye movements from searching the same scene earlier in the250
experiment, while the other scanpath showed the behaviour of the previous participant in251
the experiment (searching the same scene, but possibly with a different search instruction).252
Participants were asked to decide, by indicating the colour, which of the two scanpaths253
was their own (hence the first participant did not carry out this part of the experiment).254
Participants were not informed of the task in this part of the experiment until after they255
had carried out the first part, thus excluding the possibility that participants could modify256
their search behaviour to make it easier for them to remember their own eye movements.257
Discarded Trials. A number of trials were excluded from analysis and due to the258
design of the study (with each participant comparing their performance to that of the pre-259
vious participant), if a trial was excluded then we had exclude the subsequent participant’s260
corresponding trial. Trials with very short (<1s, 11 trials) or long (>60s, 1 trial) reaction261
times were excluded. We also excluded trials with a delay of >5 seconds between the time262
when participants pressed the space key to indicate that they had found the target, and263
when they clicked on the target with the mouse to verify they had found it (6% of the264
remaining data points). Unlike in reaction times, there was no clear cutoff to use to define265
outliers (there is a long tail of click times with a maximum of 20 seconds) and so we ran266
the analysis with and without this exclusion criterion. Results were similar in both cases.267
Results268
The difference between the conditions in terms of reaction time is summarised in269
Figure 2. A complete analysis of these data is beyond the scope of this paper,270
and can be found in Clarke, Elsner, and Rohde (2015).271
Figure 3 shows the accuracy to discriminate one’s own scanpath from that of another272
person for all possible pairs of search instructions, averaged across participants and images.273
Mirrored conditions (e.g. accuracy for the comparison of landmark to target and target to274
landmark) were averaged. It is clear from this figure that participants are generally at chance275
to correctly identify their own eye movements when the reference scanpath is from a person276
performing the same task (all points shown inside the grey box). The only conditions at277
which performance differs from chance was when the participant was searching for a different278
target from the reference (A-B, (77% with a 95% confidence interval of [66%, 86%]), A-C,279
(64%, [52%, 75%]) and A-D (66%, [54%, 76%]): in these three comparisons the search for280
the landmark alone (A) is compared to search for the target, either with or without the281
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Figure 2 . Boxplot showing distribution of each participant’s median reaction times for each
condition. The y axis is on a log scale.
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Figure 3 . Accuracy to discriminate one’s own scanpath relative to a reference scanpath from
the same (grey background) or a different (white background) search instruction condition.
Error bars show 95% binomial confidence intervals. Filled dots indicate conditions that are
above chance based on whether or not these intervals include 50%. Letters denote the search
instruction conditions: A=landmark; B=target; C=landmark-target; D=target-landmark.
landmark given as a part of the target description). We also analysed these results more282
completely, taking participant and image effects into account using a linear mixed effects283
model. The conclusions we drew from this analysis were essentially the same as those that284
can be drawn from simply examining Figure 3. We have included the model fits in Appendix285
A.286
The results from this experiment suggest that participants are not very good at dis-287
criminating their own eye movements from another person’s. Participants were above288
chance to identify which scan path was their own only when the other person289
was searching for a different object. This may be because the two scanpaths290
tended to be objectively less similar when they were searching for a different291
object, however, visual inspection of the scanpaths suggests that there were292
many trials in which participants identified the wrong scanpath as their own,293
despite salient differences between the two. (See Appendix ). This suggests it is294
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not a memory of eye movements per se that participants are using to correctly select their295
own scanpath, but a more indirect inference about the target of search compared to what296
they remember having looked for. However, this experiment included a complicated search297
and a long delay between when the search occurred and when the participant was asked to298
report on it; asking participants a simpler and more immediate question about where they299
recently looked may afford better performance.300
Experiment 2: Objects in Scenes301
As discussed in the introduction, another way in which participants could perform302
above chance in the scanpath recognition task is by assuming the objects they remember303
seeing in the scene are objects that they themselves fixated. As we will demonstrate, this304
is a strategy that can elevate participants above chance, because it is in fact the case that305
objects that are fixated in a scene are also more likely to be reported. Our second experiment306
explicitly tested whether people used this recognition strategy by testing memory for objects307
in the scene together with memory for which objects were fixated.308
A previous study by Clarke, Coco, and Keller (2013a) asked participants to verbally309
report objects from a natural scene immediately after presentation. They found the objects310
that were named tended to also have been fixated but there were also many objects that were311
named but not fixated, and objects that were fixated but not named. We took advantage312
of this existing dataset to predefine a series of objects in the set of natural scenes used by313
Clarke et al. (2013a) that were likely to be fixated and/or named. We asked participants314
to view a series of images. After each image was removed, they were asked to name objects315
they remembered from the scene. On half of trials, they were then also asked if they had316
“looked directly at” a specified query object or not. We expected participants would be able317
to correctly confirm that they looked directly at an object when they had also named it.318
We were particularly interested in whether participants could also correctly state (i) that319
they did not fixate an object that they just named as having been in the scene, and (ii)320
that they did fixate an object even though they did not name it. Being able to accurately321
classify objects as having been fixated or not fixated irrespective of whether or not they322
named them as having been in the scene would be a clear indication that people are able323
to remember their fixations separately from the objects in the scene.324
Methods325
Participants. Thirty-two participants (median age 24.5, range = 20 - 62 years326
old, 22 females) volunteered for the current study. One participant was dropped due to a327
recording error.328
Stimuli. Stimuli were taken from the set of annotated images used by Clarke et al.329
(2013a). In the original study, 24 participants viewed each image for three seconds while330
wearing an Eyelink II eye tracker. After each scene was removed from display, participants331
were asked to name objects they could remember from the scene (usually about five). Using332
these data, we searched the set of 100 images for objects that matched the following criteria:333
• Size of object was between 1000 and 60,000 pixels (1/8th of image size)334
• Object was unique in image (for example, the only chair in the image)335
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(a) “people, bench, geese, grass” (b) “laptop, mouse, chair, bed”
Figure 4 . Two example trials. In the first image, the query object was the bottle (on the
left by the bench) and the participant correctly answered that they had not fixated it. In
the second image, the query object was the laptop and we can see that while the participant
named it, they did not directly fixate it during the trial.
• Objects that were:336
– Named by at least 70% of participants and fixated by at least 60%337
– Named by at least 70% of participants and fixated by at most 33%338
– Named by at most 33% of participants and fixated by at least 60%339
– Named by at most 33% of participants and fixated by at most 33%340
We created seven trials for each condition, giving a total of 28 critical trials. Note that341
this is an a priori estimate of the actual number of trials that were expected to fall in342
each condition based on previous data; the actual number of trials falling into each of the343
conditions above was determined posthoc based on the data collected from a new set of344
participants. A further 28 filler trials, selected from the same dataset of photographs, were345
added to give a total of 56 trials. The filler trials were included in an attempt to decrease346
the amount of attention the participants would give the fixation recognition question during347
scene viewing, and instead focus on the memory question that was asked after every trial.348
Two example images are showing in Figure 4.349
Procedure. Images were shown in a randomised order. Before each image, partic-350
ipants pressed the spacebar while fixating a point in the centre of the screen and a drift351
correction was carried out. The image was then presented for three seconds before being352
removed from screen. Participants were asked to name aloud as many objects as possible353
from the scene. In order to avoid them just naming the most salient object, or using long354
term semantic memory to make a long list of educated guesses, they were encouraged to355
name “around five.” Responses were audio recorded for later transcription. Participants356
pressed the space key when done. If the trial was one of the 28 critical trials, they were357
then asked:358
“Did you look directly at the query object?”359
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Table 1
Number of Trials in each Condition.
Fixated Named Number of Trials Median Num. of Trials per Observer
Yes Yes 232 9
Yes No 296 8
No Yes 96 3
No No 232 8
Participants responded by pressing the y or n key on the keyboard. There was no time360
limit.361
Analysis. This is a binary response task with an unbalanced design. As such, a362
simple accuracy measure such as percent correct is not suitable for characterising perfor-363
mance, because individual participants may have a response bias that could run the same364
or the opposite way of the bias in what is the correct response. For example, if there is365
a general bias to say "yes" to the question of whether or not a given object was fixated,366
the proportion correct for a given individual in their reports will depend on the extent to367
which they happened to look at the queried objects in the set (rather than on their ability368
to remember looking at it, which is what we are actually interested in). We therefore need369
an appropriate measure of how well people can discriminate their accurate from their in-370
accurate eye movements. Hence we will present our results using two statistics commonly371
used in the classification literature: precision and recall. If we are trying to classify A from372
B, then the definitions are as follows:373
• Accuracy: the proportion of all items successfully classified.374
• Precision: the proportion items classified as A that are actually A.375
• Recall: the proportion of items belonging to class A that are classified as A.376
An object was considered to have been fixated by a participant if at least one of their377
fixations fell within a polygon marking the outline of the object.378
Results379
Participants appeared to manage the naming task reasonably well, naming at least380
four objects on nearly all trials. Two example trials with overlaid scanpaths and named381
objects are shown in Figure 4.382
As explained above, image-object pairs were selected from an existing dataset to try383
and obtain an approximately equal number of trials containing query objects of roughly384
equal size in each of four conditions (fixated/not fixated × named/not named). However,385
as we have no control over which objects observers look at or name, we expected this to386
vary from person to person. The trials were therefore re-categorised into the same four387
conditions using the data based on our new participants’ actual behaviour. The number of388
trials in each condition is shown in Table 1. With the exception of not fixated yet named389
objects, we have an approximately even split of trials over condition.390
We then examined accuracy in the fixation recollection task as a function of whether391
or not the queried object was named. The results are shown in Figure 5a. Observers392
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Figure 5 . (a) Accuracy statistics for the objects experiment. Accuracy to state whether an
object has been fixated or not is modestly above chance. However, for objects that were
not named, participants tend to report not having fixated it even when they had, resulting
in a very low recall score. (b) Difference scores when comparing the observed accuracy to
expected accuracy under a strategy of (i) responding that you fixated the object if and only
if you named it (“named”) and (ii) simply responding that you fixated every query object
(“yes”).
are more accurate at determining whether or not they fixated named objects on all three393
measures (accuracy: median of 69% for named objects compared to 61% for unnamed394
objects; precision: 78% compared to 67%; and recall: 88% compared to 24%). The largest395
difference in between conditions is in recall, where the recall of fixated unnamed objects is396
very low. This means that participants tended to incorrectly state that they did not fixate397
an object when it was an object they had not named. When we compare these results to398
some simplistic baseline strategies (Figure 5b), we can see that human performance only399
marginally outperforms some very simple response strategies: in particular, performance400
is quite close to what would be expected if participants simply stated they fixated those401
objects which they had named (median difference of 3.8%), with about 25% of participants402
under-performing this strategy. Even more participants under-performed the strategy of403
simply stating “yes” every time they were asked if they fixated a particular object.404
We can further analyse these data by fitting a general linear mixed model to inves-405
tigate how the participant’s response (whether they believe they have looked at the query406
object or not) is influenced by (i) whether they have actually looked at the object and (ii)407
whether they named the object. We fit a model with random intercepts for both participant408
and image and the fixed effects are shown in Figure 6. The results demonstrate that al-409
though actually fixating the object does influence the participant’s response (the probability410
of participant responding that they had fixated an object which they had neither fixated411
or named was 14%, while for objects which were fixated but not named this rises to 33%),412
the influence of whether or not a given object was named is even larger (63%). Following413
advice on areas-of-interest padding (Orquin, Ashby, & Clarke, 2015) we re-analysed the414
data, expanding the radii of the AOIs between 1% and 25%. We found that this made little415
difference to the model, and all estimated coefficients remained within the 95% confidence416
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Figure 6 . (a) Fixed effects from general linear mixed model with 95% confidence intervals.
(b) Logistic transform of fixed effects for each experimental condition. We can see that a
named object is more likely to be reported as fixated than one that actually was fixated.
intervals presented in Figure 6.417
We also explore the extent to which total fixation duration has on the likelihood of418
a participant reporting that they had fixated an object. We analyse the subset of the data419
consisting of all trials in which the participant fixated the target object, and rerun the420
general linear mixed model replacing the binary fixated factor with log total dwell time.421
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals suggest some evidence of a possible relationship422
between fixation duration and participant response (β = 0.6, CI=[0.065, 1.333]). However,423
these results should be treated with caution given the small sample size and documented424
relationship between fixation duration and the likelihood of an object being named (Clarke425
et al., 2013a)426
Our results suggest that observers have little to no memory for what they fixated, and427
simply respond that they looked at the objects that they named. This is in contrast to the428
conclusions of Foulsham and Kingstone (2013), but we believe participants could have em-429
ployed an object-memory strategy in their experiment at least on some trials, which would430
be sufficient to boost accuracy above chance. An important design difference between our431
study and Foulsham & Kingstone’s is that they did not ask participants about their eye432
movements until all images had been viewed (as in our Experiment 1). Here we asked par-433
ticipants about their eye movements directly after they had viewed the image, which should,434
if anything, have improved accuracy relative to a delayed recollection. Asking immediately435
following the trial does, however, mean that over the course of the experiment, participants436
would potentially be able to alter their viewing strategy to increase their performance in437
the fixation recollection task. However, given the low accuracy at this task, this does not438
appear to have happened.439
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Experiment 3: Double-step Saccades440
The last of our three experiments investigated whether individuals could identify their441
eye movements in a simple saccade task towards a single visual target, in which participants442
were fully aware that they would need to report on their eye movements on every trial.443
Participants simply made a saccade to a peripheral target. On half of trials, the peripheral444
target jumped to a new position while the saccade was being executed. Participants tend to445
perform a corrective saccade to the target’s new position (known as a double-step saccade),446
although they typically do not notice the change in target position (Becker & Jürgens,447
1979; Bridgeman et al., 1975). The disruption to the saccade introduced by the position448
shift in the saccade target could, however, provide a signal to the participant that they could449
use to differentiate their own eye movement from someone else’s, if this is indeed possible.450
After each trial, participants viewed an “instant re-play” animation depicting either the451
eye movement(s) the participant just executed or those of someone else. An animation was452
used to give the participants as much temporal and spatial information about the movement453
as possible. The aim of the experiment was to determine if participants were sensitive to454
executing either single or double step saccades and as a result if they can discriminate their455
eye movements from someone else’s.456
Methods457
Participants. Twenty-eight participants (17 female) volunteered for this experi-458
ment, aged between 21 and 29 years old.459
Stimuli. Stimuli consisted of a 2◦× 2◦ fixation cross displayed upon a blank screen460
at the start of each trial. Subsequent single or double fixation crosses were presented either461
right or left of the original central fixation cross depending on condition.462
Procedure. Participants were given a practice block of 16 trials to allow them to463
increase the speed at which they made their eye movements as well as improve their final464
fixation accuracy so they landed at the centre of the movement target. Participants had to465
successfully complete a minimum of 12 of these trials in order to carry on to the complete466
the full experiment (criteria for “successful” is given below); if they failed to complete 12,467
they repeated the practice until they reached this criterion. The experiment consisted of468
six blocks of 37 trials, however, trials in which participants made an incorrect movement469
or were above the speed threshold were omitted. At the start of each trial a fixation cross470
was displayed at the centre of the screen. In order to begin each trial participants fixated471
the cross and pressed the space bar. After a successful drift correction a smaller central472
fixation cross was displayed and at the same time an additional second movement target473
cross was presented at one of three locations to the left or right of the central fixation cross474
(six locations in total). Participants were instructed to simply move their eyes to the target475
as quickly and accurately as possible. On half of the trials the fixation point remained in476
the same location throughout the trial. On half of these trials the second cross was 11.5◦477
from the centre, and the other half of trials the cross was 15.8◦ from the centre. In the478
remaining half of the trials where the cross was initially shown at 13.7◦ from the centre,479
and either jumped inwards (to 11.5◦) or outwards (to 15.8◦) once a saccade was detected480
(simply defined as when the x-coordinate of the current gaze location was more than 1.4◦481
from the centre of display).482
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Figure 7 . An example of a gaze replay presented to participants. In the actual experiment,
this line was traced out in real time.
To successfully complete a trial, participants were required to fixate the movement483
target (defined as a period of 50ms in which all gaze samples were within 2◦ of the centre of484
the fixation cross). If this criteria was not met within 600ms of target onset, the trial was485
counted as invalid and the participant was shown a red screen for 3000ms. If participants486
successfully completed a trial, a further 50ms of gaze samples were collected, followed by487
a blank screen for 500ms, after which participants were shown a replay of gaze behaviour488
during the trial. In half of the trials, they were shown their own eye movements in an489
animated replay, drawn on the screen, sample-by-sample, in real time. In the other half of490
the trials, they were shown a pre-recorded eye movement collected in a pilot experiment.491
The replay displayed two fixation crosses: the central fixation cross and the movement492
target cross at either the final inwards or outwards position (see Figure 7). Participants493
were asked to identify whether the gaze replay shown was theirs or someone else’s. If they494
believed the gaze replay was theirs they pressed y on the keyboard, if they believed the gaze495
replay shown wasn’t theirs they pressed n. They were informed that the replay would be496
their own eye movement 50% of the time.497
The colour of the display screen changed colour depending on what phase of the trial498
the participant was completing. This was implemented to help participants keep track of499
the task. In the first phase, in which they were making, or preparing to make, an eye500
movement, the screen was presented as pale orange. In the second phase, when participants501
were watching, or preparing to watch, the gaze replay, the screen was blue. See Figure 7502
for an example.503
Discarded Trials. Any trials in which participants did not fixate the movement504
target for a minimum period of 50ms, in which all gaze samples were within 2◦ of the centre505
of the fixation cross, were excluded from further analysis. Also any trials in which this506
criteria was not met within 600ms of target onset were counted as invalid and discarded507
from further analysis. Under these criteria, a mean of 73% of trials from each participant508
were included in the analysis (with a large range of individual differences: 40% - 94%). Four509
participants had over half of their trials discarded.510
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Inwards target Outwards target
forwards correction 122 759
accurate saccade 985 494
backwards correction 217 5
Table 2
Number of saccades falling into each category. Categories were defined with respect
to the target’s end position: trials in which the target moved inwards from the
central position are grouped with the trials in which the target appeared, and
remained, at the closer (to the centre of the display) position. Similar for
targets that moved outwards, away from the central fixation cross.
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Figure 8 . Accuracy with 95% Confidence interval for each participant. The filled dots
indicate the participants who did better than chance.
Results511
Table 2 shows the distribution of saccade types by target position. Note, this collapses512
over trials in which the target appeared at the inwards/outwards position, and those in513
which it appeared in the central position and then moved.514
Participants were required to accurately identify if the gaze path presented at the end515
of each trial was their own or someone else’s. Accuracy to do so (in terms of the proportion516
of trials with a correct response) was poor (mean participant accuracy = 52%, with only517
five out of 28 participants managing to perform better than chance,with the most accurate518
participant achieving a score of 70%. Three participants performed below chance.519
Although overall accuracy was around 50%, classification differed between comparison520
conditions. In particular, when participants were shown a direct saccade or a saccade with a521
forward bias, they had a strong tendency to classify that saccade as their own. Conversely,522
participants rarely classified saccades with backward corrections as their own. As can523
be seen in Table 2, participants did perform far fewer backward corrections than forward524
corrections or direct saccades. This is clear from Figure 9a, which shows the tendency to525
“claim” (i.e. identify as “mine”) saccades on trials in which the participant was shown their526
own saccade: when participants actually made a backward correction, they were far less527
likely to claim the saccade than if they made a forward correction or direct saccade.528
We can also break the results down into similar categories on trials in which the529
participants were shown someone else’s eye movements, shown in Figure 9b. Again, partic-530
ipants are more likely to (now erroneously) state a saccade is their own when it is direct531
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Figure 9 . (a) Proportion of trials on which participants stated the saccade was their own
for only those trials in which they were actually shown their own saccade. When the
saccade was direct or had a forward correction, they were far more likely to state it was
their own than when it contained a backward correction. (b) Proportion of trials on which
participants stated the saccade was their own, for trials in which they were shown someone
else’s backward correction (first panel), direct saccade (second panel) or forward correction
(third panel). The three bars within each panel separate the results based on which type
of saccade the participant has themselves just executed; backward saccades were not very
common, so this category should be interpreted with caution. In general, participants were
just as likely to claim a saccade was their own when it matched the saccade they just
executed as when it did not.
or forwards. Saccades that fell into a different category than the one that had just been532
executed were as likely to be claimed as saccades that were in the same category. This con-533
firms that participants have a bias to identify correct saccades as their own, and incorrect534
saccades as having been generated by someone else. To the extent that participants do tend535
to produce correct saccades, this bias boosts their overall accuracy in the discrimination536
task, but it is clear they have little to no insight into their own saccade errors.537
Discussion538
Previous work has suggested that people have a surprisingly limited ability539
to report on their own eye movements. However, as explained in the introduc-540
tion, the methods used to answer this question could have a large impact on the541
results. Therefore, by design, each of our three experiments were conducted542
using very different paradigms. Although each experiment tackles the question543
differently they all converge on the same conclusion that, in general, people are544
even less aware of their own eye movements than previous research suggested.545
In Experiment 1 we varied which target the person searched for, and, more sub-546
tly, altered the linguistic structure of the target description to include a salient landmark547
description either before or after the target was specified. If participants can extract infor-548
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mation about the goals or intentions driving the eye movements and compare it to their549
own, they should be better able to discriminate their own eye movements when compared550
against a person searching for a different target, and/or against a person searching based551
on different instructions from their own. Indeed, we found that participants’ performance552
was highest (although still not particularly high) when they were comparing their scan path553
to one that was looking for a different target. However, when their scanpath was shown554
together with that of a different person searching for the same target, even when they were555
following a different search instruction, discrimination was at chance. This indirectly sug-556
gests that participants are basing their judgements on inferences about goals, rather than557
any detailed memory of their own actual eye movements. But could it just be too difficult a558
task to remember visual details well enough to discriminate them from a relatively similar559
foil shown up to ten minutes later? Probably not; experiments on recognition memory for560
small variations in object identity or position has shown this capacity to be surprisingly561
large, even when testing memory for thousands of similar objects at a delay of several hours562
(Brady et al., 2008). In the present study, participants were asked about their eye move-563
ments immediately following their execution in Experiments 2 and 3, and there was little564
evidence that this boosted performance much compared to Experiment 1, suggesting the565
poor performance is due not to fixational memory decaying over time, but to it having not566
been present in the first place. Another consideration is that we are concluding participants567
are “at chance” based on an aggregate score with confidence intervals that overlap chance568
(50%), leaving open the possibility that some of our participants genuinely perform above569
chance at identifying their own scanpaths. That said, it is possible that these participants570
(and/or the person with whom their scanpaths were paired) had features in their scanpaths571
that were unique and easily identifiable, such as systematic calibration errors or tremor.572
This could inflate accuracy above chance for some individuals, again because of indirect573
inferences as opposed to memory of one’s own selection of fixations per se. Even though we574
cannot eliminate this possible alternative route to accurate performance, aggregate results575
are still at chance, suggesting at the very least that the majority of participants cannot576
accurately recall their own scanpath.577
In Experiment 2 we established that individuals are able to use a memory of which578
objects were present in the scene as a reasonable approximation of which objects were579
fixated. Indeed, if participants simply report that they fixated any object they remember580
having seen, the overall accuracy of these reports would be about 60-70%, suggesting this581
is a good strategy for achieving above-chance accuracy even in the absence of any explicit582
memory of fixations themselves. The results when we split recognition performance by583
whether objects were named or not reveals that participants were relying on this strategy584
almost entirely, with very low recall for objects that were not named - in other words,585
participants thought they had fixated named objects even when they had not, and vice-586
versa. Indeed, having named an object was a better predictor of whether a given participant587
stated they had fixated it than whether or not they actually fixated it. That said, after588
accounting for the effect of naming, there was some variability in judgement of fixations that589
could be accounted for by the fixations themselves. This could suggest that participants590
had some memory for their own fixations independent of whether they remember the object591
in the scene. On the other hand, we asked participants to name “around five” objects in the592
scene, and it is quite plausible that some objects were encoded but then not subsequently593
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named. This could be because participants could not easily put a verbal label on the object,594
or simply prioritised it less than other objects in the scene. In any case, those few trials on595
which participants report having fixated an object they did not name could represent trials596
on which they encoded, but did not name, the object. Given how infrequent these instances597
are, we can at the very least say that the dominant strategy for deciding whether an object598
was fixated or not is to use one’s own memory of whether or not it was in the scene at all.599
Given that this strategy leads to above-chance accuracy in the fixation recall task, caution600
should be exercised while interpreting results from experiments in which participants can601
rely on memory for objects instead of fixations for accurate self-report (as they could in602
Foulsham and Kingstone, 2012). This self-report is not an indication of a memory for603
fixations, but rather a memory of what objects were or were not present in a scene.604
In both Experiments 1 and 2 we find clear evidence that participants rely on alterna-605
tive strategies rather than fixational memory when reporting on their own eye movements.606
This suggests we do not store a representation of fixations, at least not one we can easily607
report. However, in both studies the task was difficult, and the real purpose of the study608
was to some extent disguised; in the first experiment by not probing recognition memory609
until the end, and in the second by only asking about fixations on a smaller subset of tri-610
als. Based on these two experiments alone, the possibility remains that participants can611
in fact maintain a representation of their own eye movements as long as this information612
is task-relevant, but when this information is not consistently required it is not accessed,613
stored, or maintained. In the final experiment, therefore, we made it explicitly clear that614
the main task of the experiment was to remember and report on one’s own saccades. The615
simpler saccade task circumvents the use of task inference or object memory, focuses on a616
memory of eye movements to a single target, and asks participants to immediately recognise617
an animation of this eye movement after every trial. We increased the variability of the eye618
movement by inducing corrections, and we used real-time animations to present as much619
spatial and temporal information to the observer as possible. Nonetheless, participants as620
a group were at chance at this task: only half of the trials participants identified as their621
own were actually their own. This conclusion is based on aggregate accuracy, however;622
there were five (of 28) participants who were significantly different from chance when their623
results are examined individually. As in Experiment 1, it may be that these participants do624
in fact have a clearer representation of their own eye movement trajectories than the other625
23 participants, but there are at least two other possible explanations. One is that the eye626
movements of these five participants had distinctive characteristics (e.g. fixation tremor)627
that made their eye movements more easily detected relative to the comparison eye move-628
ment than the others. A second explanation is that these participants were simply better629
at noticing and using small systematic differences between eye movements to discriminate630
one group from another.631
In all the above experiments, the experience of the eye movement itself is different632
from the medium we used to probe memory. In the first experiment, we showed scanpaths633
as a series of lines connecting fixated points, which provides spatial and sequence informa-634
tion, but temporal information was removed. In the second experiment the memory probe635
was even further abstracted from the actual experience of fixating the object because we636
asked verbally about an object that was present in a scene which was no longer visible.637
Even in the final experiment, in which we replayed the eye movement back in real-time,638
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the experience of actually moving the eyes would have been quite different from the repre-639
sentation of that movement as a dot on the screen. We did consider making the animation640
an even closer match to the participant’s own immediate experience of the eye movement641
they just executed by replaying the movement of the saccade target across the retina as642
a consequence of the eye movement. However, we assumed that naive participants would643
have a difficult time understanding what we were showing them, given that this is not the644
way people tend to report or describe their eye movements; most people intuitively refer to645
the image as remaining fixed and their eyes changing position on that image, rather than646
the eye movements changing the position of the image itself. The anecdotal observation647
that we do not easily or naturally comprehend the effect of our own eye movements on the648
image falling on our retina is broadly consistent with our conclusion that we do not have649
a very accurate representation (if any) of these movements in the first place. The lack of650
awareness of the visual impact of one’s own eye movements is often referred to as saccadic651
suppression (Matin, 1974). The threshold to detect stimuli, particularly motion signals, is652
elevated during saccades, likely due to a combination of post-saccadic masking (Campbell &653
Wurtz, 1978; Ibbotson & Cloherty, 2009) and active suppression of some pathways and sig-654
nals (Bremmer, Kubischik, Hoffmann, & Krekelberg, 2009; Ross, Burr, & Morrone, 1996).655
There is clear evidence of ongoing visual processing of form and flicker during saccades656
Hunt, Chapman, and Kingstone (2008), Watanabe, Noritake, Maeda, Tachi, and Nishida657
(2005), indicating that suppression is selective to some channels. As noted in the intro-658
duction, however, participants tend to be unaware of displacements in the saccade target659
position that occur during saccades (Bridgeman et al., 1975) despite the fact that rapid660
corrective saccades are executed to the new target position (Becker & Jürgens, 1979), and661
after repeated displacements in the same direction, saccade execution adapts to land on the662
expected final position of the target, rather than where it is presented before the saccade663
(e.g. Deubel, 1995). Rapid saccadic corrections and adaptations demonstrate that the dis-664
placement signal is incorporated into visually-guided actions, despite it being inaccessible665
to conscious awareness. In other words, visual signals that are clearly sufficient to guide666
motor control and motor learning are nonetheless not sufficient for perceptual experience.667
The same dissociation of perceptual experience from attentional and motor control668
appears to apply to the process of planning, executing, and monitoring saccades and fixa-669
tions. Although our results suggest we are not able to accurately report on our eye move-670
ments, we clearly use information about saccade target selection to guide behaviour over671
the short and long term. For example, eye movements towards previously-fixated locations672
tended to be slower and less frequent during extended search, an effect normally referred673
to as inhibition of return (e.g. Klein & MacInnes, 1999; MacInnes, Hunt, Hilchey, & Klein,674
2014). The existence of IOR suggests we store and use a representation of where the eyes675
have been to facilitate inspection of locations that have not yet been visited. Similarly, in676
priming of pop-out (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994) and contextual cueing (Chun & Jiang,677
1998), attention is deployed more rapidly when certain aspects of the search array have678
been viewed previously, suggesting a stored representation of previous instances of search679
that can facilitate target detection. Despite the fact that we clearly have, and use, repre-680
sentations of previous instances of visual search, the current study has demonstrated that681
the ability to explicitly report on this information appears to be minimal, or possibly ab-682
sent altogether. This is consistent with other instances in the literature of dissociations683
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between our perceptual experience and visually-guided actions in terms of what informa-684
tion they can access and use. Some of these are somewhat controversial, for example, the685
extent to which visually-guided actions are impervious to visual illusions is the subject of686
heated debate (e.g. Aglioti, Beltramello, Tassinari, & Berlucchi, 1998; Bruno, 2001; Franz,687
Gegenfurtner, Bülthoff, & Fahle, 2000; van Zoest & Hunt, 2011). However, it is a relatively688
well-accepted view that that there is some separation in how and where the visual system689
stores and represents information that is relevant to action versus that which is relevant690
for identification, conscious report, and explicit memory (Milner & Goodale, 1995). Klein691
(1980) suggested that eye movements operate at a level of the visual system that can be692
separated from attentional processes, inconsistent with premotor theory. Hunt and King-693
stone (2003), based on a dissociation in how attention and eye movements were affected694
by target luminance, concluded that at least some eye movements may be planned and695
deployed before attentional effects are instantiated. The current results, in demonstrating696
we have a severely limited ability to introspect on our own eye movements, are similarly697
inconsistent with attention being deployed to the target of each saccade, presuming that698
attending to these targets would make them more available for conscious report.699
In conclusion, our research has demonstrated awareness of one’s own eye700
movements is extremely limited. We used a converging methods approach,701
constructing three very different ways to probe awareness. In each experiment,702
participants clearly used every available strategy to boost their accuracy, but703
when these strategies were not available, the accuracy with which most partici-704
pants could identify their own scan path, fixations, or individual eye movement705
was close to chance. Eye movements play a pivotal role in how we view and706
perceive our environment by determining our primary visual input, as shaped707
by the strategies we deploy to search and extract information. These processes708
rely on information which appears to be accessed by our visual, attentional, and709
motor systems, but is unavailable to us consciously. This suggests conscious ac-710
cess and control is unnecessary for a wide range of visual, attentional, and711
motor processes, including perceptual stability across saccades, motor learning,712
saccade target selection, and inhibition of return. In practical terms, the ex-713
tent to which people are aware of their own eye movements also has important714
implications for industry, in which there is an increasing interest in using eye715
movements in diagnostics, training and interface control. For example, infor-716
mation about eye movements during task performance has been used in aircraft717
inspection training (Duchowski et al., 2000); interactive graphic display usabil-718
ity (Zhu & Ji, 2004), diagnosis of visual distraction in drivers (Zhang, Smith,719
& Witt, 2006) and evaluating surgical performance (Tien, Atkins, Zheng, &720
Swindells, 2010). These approaches rely on the assumption that individuals721
are consciously aware of their own eye movements, can actively retrieve this722
information, and can provide accurate reports based on viewing their own scan723
patterns. The results of the current study seriously undermine this assumption.724
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Reference instruction
A B C D
A 0.30 (0.40) 0.92 (0.41) 0.24 (0.39) 0.70 (0.37)
Observer B 1.60 (0.43) 0.21 (0.36) 0.33 (0.39) 0.13 (0.35)
Instruction C 0.91 (0.43) 0.33 (0.31) 0.33 (0.34) 0.41 (0.39)
D 0.66 (0.38) 0.11 (0.36) 0.36 (0.34) -0.06 (0.36)
Table 3
General linear mixed Effect Model coefficients (and standard error). Comparisons for which
the 95% confidence interval does not include 0 are shaded. These can be thought of as
significant at an alpha of p < 0.05.
and analyzed by ADFC.728
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Appendix A733
Linear mixed-effect model of results from Experiment 1: We ran a general linear
mixed-effect model (family=binomial) using the lm4 package for R. Specifically, we fit the
model:
recog ∼ reID1 : reID2 + 0 + (1|participant) + (1|image) (1)
We force the intercept to be 0 so that the beta coefficients are more easily interpretable:734
larger positive coefficients mean that it is easier to successfully recognise your eye movements735
in the scanpath recognition task, where as negative coefficients mean performance worse736
than chance. The model fit with standard errors is presented in Table 3. The results are737
in good agreement with the means presented in Figure 3, with the largest effects being seen738
for the target-landmark (A-B) and landmark-target (B-A) comparisons.739
Appendix B740
In Experiment 1 we found that participants did slightly better than chance when741
asked to identify their own scan-path from somebody else searching the same image, but742
with a different referring expression. When their scan-path was paired with one recorded743
from another participant following exactly the same referring expression, accuracy was at744
chance levels. One interpretation of these results is that participants have some limited745
ability to do an "inverse Yarbus" task, and can occasionally2 recognise their scan-path by746
working out which one best fits the task they remember completely.747
A potential confound however is that as the structure of the linguistic referring ex-748
pression varies, the difference between the two scan-paths increases. This raises the question749
of whether participants’ inability to recognise their own eye movements is due to the two750
2even in the easiest condition, accuracy was only at 75%
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 10 . Examples of trials in which the observer’s scan-path was paired with one from a
second observer carrying out the same condition. In all examples given above, the observer
failed to identify which scan-path was their own.
alternative choices being too similar to one another. We explore this possibility in Figure 10751
which shows a selection of trials in which the two scan-paths are from observers following the752
same referring expression, and the participant was unable to identify which scan-path was753
their own. We can see that even though the two observers were given the same instructions,754
there are often large differences in where they looked.755
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